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Abstract 
We provide evidence that managerial ability is positively and significantly related to the 
issuance method decision of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in the U.S. market. Our result 
is robust after controlling for various internal and external governance mechanisms, 
addressing the problem of endogeneity, and adopting a number of alternative specifications. 
We further find that the impact of managerial ability on the SEOs issuance choice is stronger 
for firms with higher information asymmetry, CEO duality and weaker governance settings. 
Overall, our study supports the notion that higher managerial ability is perceived as a positive 
quality certification on firm information environments.  
Keywords: Seasoned equity offerings; Managerial ability; Information asymmetry; CEO 
duality; Institutional investors 
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1. Introduction 
Extant research on seasoned equity offerings links issuance method choice with information 
asymmetry, information content, signalling, market timing, moral hazard and elasticity of 
stock demand (e.g., Heron and Lie, 2004; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2005; Gao and Ritter, 2010; 
Pandes, 2010; Autore et al., 2011). Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) posit that better and more 
reputable managers can convey the intrinsic value of their firm more credibly to outsiders, 
thereby reducing firm-level information asymmetry in the equity market. Chemmanur et al. 
(2010) observe that firm SEO performance is positively related with managerial quality. We 
posit that managerial quality should also be an important aspect of the prior SEO issue 
execution process. To date, however, the current literature is silent on the potentially 
important association between top management characteristics and SEO issuance preferences. 
Extending existing research, we focus on the role of managerial quality and argue that the 
quality and reputation of a firm’s management will feed into the quality assurance and 
information set associated with SEO issues and are expected to influence firm issuance 
choice decision-making in SEOs.  
The current literature has also highlighted the important role of managerial ability in 
improving firm quality (e.g., Beasley, 1996; Demerjian et al., 2012, 2013). Specifically, the 
above studies find that higher firm managerial ability is positively related to corporate 
financial reporting quality, and associated with a positive managerial fixed effect on firm 
performance. In a similar vein, Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) find a positive relation 
between managerial quality and firm performance in the post initial public offering (IPO) 
period. In the context of SEOs, the role of managerial ability is relatively intuitive. This is 
because, in an equity issuance process, the underwriters will assess firm quality when 
choosing to underwrite SEOs. An underwriter’s risk of damaging their reputation will be 
lower when underwriting the SEO of a firm with a superior information environment and 
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more-reputable management. This argument implies that firms with higher management 
quality and reputation are more likely to be associated with more reputable underwriters, 
which increases the success likelihood of the SEOs. Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) further 
investigate the relation between firm management quality and various IPO issue aspects, 
including size, underwriting expenses, post announcement performance of IPOs, and indicate 
that management quality affects the characteristics of firm IPOs. The authors interpret their 
results as evidence that better and more-reputable management is more able to certify the 
quality of their firm to the financial markets and can reduce information asymmetry between 
a firm’s insiders and outsiders. This argument also implies that financial intermediaries, such 
as underwriters, investigative accountants and institutional investors, will incur lower costs of 
producing information about the firm that, in turn, affects the characteristics of such firms’ 
equity offerings, for instance, offer size, offer execution time, underwriting spread, and other 
offering-related expenses. Moreover, better and more-reputable managers may be able to 
select more suitable projects for their firms that are characterized by larger net present values 
for any given scale. As such, firms with higher quality managers are likely to have a greater 
equilibrium scale of investment and larger equity offerings (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005).  
Regarding SEOs, accelerated offerings typically take 1 day to complete compared to 31 
days between filing and offer dates in the case of fully-marketed offerings. Given this very 
short time-frame, the key issue is how offering firms deal with asymmetric information while 
using the accelerated offering method for issuing SEOs. Since an underwriter’s reputation 
risk associated with failing to correctly assess the prospect of SEOs is heightened in the case 
of accelerated SEOs, the question is whether the managerial ability of the issuing firm can act 
as a quality certification signal for the underwriters to assess the firm’s information 
environment. From the underwriter’s point of view, compared to accelerated SEOs, in firm 
commitment SEOs there is time to conduct an accurate due diligence analysis. There is also a 
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huge amount of information gathering and marketing effort required by underwriters as part 
of executing firm commitment SEOs. We argue that firms can use certification mechanisms 
such as the signals and indicators of managerial quality to mitigate the degree of due 
diligence investigation required to be completed by underwriters. We further argue that firms 
may employ quality management mechanisms, including people and processes, to reduce the 
extent of information asymmetry between managers of offering firms and potential investors, 
with underwriters and investment bankers mediating between them. We, therefore, posit that 
firms with more capable managers are more likely to select the accelerated offering process 
compared to the firm commitment method when undertaking SEOs. 
In this paper, we investigate the certification role played by top management in SEO 
transactions in the U.S. equity market, and how management quality is related to firm SEO 
issuance method decisions. Specifically, we examine whether firms with higher management 
ability / quality are more likely to conduct accelerated SEOs than firm commitment offerings 
due to lower levels of perceived firm risk and information asymmetry. We also conduct 
additional analysis controlling for a number of firm-level corporate governance mechanisms 
to examine whether corporate governance may have a complimentary or offsetting role on 
how managerial quality is associated with firm outcomes. To test our hypotheses, we use the 
Thomson One Banker (SDC module) database to identify U.S public companies that raise 
equity via accelerated and firm commitment methods, and construct a U.S sample over the 
2001-2013 period. We follow prior studies and create a dummy variable taking the value of 
one if the firm undertakes an accelerated SEO, and otherwise zero for firm commitment 
SEOs. In terms of top management quality, we use the managerial ability score developed by 
Demerjian et al. (2012) to proxy for firm-level managerial ability. To avoid omitted 
correlated variables, we control for a number of factors that potentially affect SEO decisions, 
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as found in the current literature, and include industry- and year-fixed effects across all 
specifications. 
The results obtained support our underlying hypothesis. We find that firms with higher 
quality managers (firms with higher managerial ability scores) are more likely to undertake 
accelerated offerings. Furthermore, this result is only found to be evident in firms with higher 
levels of underlying information asymmetry, supporting our assertion that managerial quality 
aids in resolving firm-level information asymmetry, at least as it relates to capital raising 
activities. Our findings further remain unchanged after controlling for potential endogeneity 
between managerial ability and issuance choice dynamics using propensity score matching, 
instrumental variable and fixed effects estimation techniques. This result still holds after 
controlling for the potential moderating role of various internal and external governance 
mechanisms.    
Overall, our study contributes to the literature on the influence of managerial ability on 
firm-level decision-making and performance and valuation outcomes. This is the first study 
to examine the contribution of managerial ability to firm equity issuance decisions based on 
different offering characteristics associated with SEOs, and it provides further evidence on 
the effect of information asymmetry in motivating corporate financial decision-making. Our 
study adds to the limited literature that shows that managerial quality plays an important 
assurance role regarding the integrity of financial statements and other firm fundamental and 
performance information, and in reducing information asymmetry. Our findings on the 
relation between managerial ability and SEO offering method choice contribute to the 
growing literature on the positive impact of higher managerial ability (e.g., Chemmanur and 
Paeglis, 2005; Chemmanur et al., 2010; Demerjian et al., 2012, 2013).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents prior empirical evidence, 
related hypotheses, along with the objectives of this paper. A description of the data is 
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provided in Section 3. Section 4 reports the empirical results and additional robustness tests, 
and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Hypothesis development 
This study investigates the role played by skilled managers in improving firms’ information 
environments. In a generic sense, more talented managers have more knowledge about their 
business and consequently make good and sensible business decisions. More capable 
managers are better informed about their firm and the industry they operate in, and can see 
how decisions and choices affect the overall long-term value of their company. Furthermore, 
they are better adept at selecting worthwhile projects for their firms to create higher net 
present value. Consistent with the existing literature, a number of prior studies provide 
evidence on the effect of management characteristics and styles on firm performance (e.g., 
Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Fee and Hadlock, 2003; Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Switzer and 
Bourdon, 2011). Particularly, Demerjian et al. (2012) report that superior managers 
understand the role played by technology and industry trends, better manage the efficiency of 
day-to-day operations and generation of revenue from available resources, and utilize the 
proceeds from equity financing more effectively. They can reliably predict product demand, 
and invest in higher value projects and manage their employees more efficiently than less 
able managers. Milbourn (2003) also documents that good managers have higher pay-for-
performance sensitivities longer CEO tenure, more prior media mentions, and are more likely 
to have been appointed from outside of the firm. In a similar vein, Leverty and Grace (2012) 
document that more skilled managers are less likely to enter into the dangers of potential 
bankruptcy.  
Regarding the financial market reaction to actions and outcomes of higher-quality 
managers, Chemmanur (1993) finds that better and more reputable management teams can 
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convey the value of their firms more credibly to the equity market and, thus, reduce 
information asymmetry. Moreover, firms with reputable management exhibit lower 
underpricing levels in equity offerings. Similarly, Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) examine 
the relation between managerial ability and reputation and a variety of firm IPO 
characteristics and post-IPO performance. They provide evidence of a positive relation 
between managerial quality and offer volume, offer characteristics and long-term 
performance. Chemmanur et al. (2009) support that firms with less information asymmetry 
are more likely to favor issuance of equity, and receive a fair price for it. Chemmanur et al. 
(2010) identify better firm performance from completing SEOs in the presence of superior 
management practices. They also highlight that, although in the SEO phase, the extent of the 
asymmetric information problem is expected to be smaller than in the IPO phase, as SEOs are 
typically conducted by mature and more complex firms and, hence, the influence of 
management quality on firm value is expected to be higher in SEOs than in the IPO context. 
Although existing empirical findings support the contention that firms conducting SEOs face 
less information asymmetry compared to that observed for IPOs, one might expect that a 
higher level of management quality coupled with less information asymmetry may result in 
different SEO issuance method choice. Prior studies have ignored such a possibility. 
On the other hand, the existing literature documents that larger and more valuable firms 
are more likely to choose accelerated SEOs to raise additional equity capital (Bortolotti et al., 
2008). The accelerated SEOs process is completed in 1 day, as compared to 31 days for fully 
marketed or firm commitment offerings. Accelerated offerings increase competition between 
underwriters and place additional pressures on them to do their due diligence investigations 
more thoroughly, due to the restricted time process (Koerniadi and Tourani-Rad, 2015). This 
time constraint could potentially increase the cost of investigations and, hence, the signaling 
role of leadership skills becomes increasingly crucial. In this sense, we argue that firms with 
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higher managerial ability can act as a quality assurance mechanism that reduces the cost of 
due diligence associated with the equity issue process both from demand and supply side 
dynamics. Moreover, SEO firms with more skilled managers may reduce the pressure on 
underwriters and, therefore, they can quickly assess the market demand before committing to 
an offer price. Further, firms with higher management quality have been found to be 
associated with more reputable underwriters. Given the reduction in the extent and cost of 
due diligence activities, the time difference required to complete the two different SEO issue 
techniques, and the identified lower level of information asymmetry associated with firms 
with higher managerial ability, we therefore predict the main hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis: There is a positive relationship between firm-level managerial ability and the 
likelihood of undertaking an accelerated SEO offering rather than a firm commitment 
offering. 
 
3.  Sample and descriptive 
Our primary data source constitutes all the seasoned equity offerings announced during the 
period 2001 to 2013 by U.S public companies. We use the Thomson One Banker (SDC 
module) database to identify U.S public companies that raise equity via accelerated and firm 
commitment methods. Initially, we obtain a raw sample of 17,289 seasoned equity offerings. 
We then exclude 7,433 offerings because they do not have any shelf offering details in the 
SDC module. We further delete events with incomplete offering firm codes, duplicate 
issuances, and those issues which are units, preference shares, warrants, trust units, American 
Depositary Shares (ADRs), and convertible bonds. We also exclude firms without the 
managerial ability measure provided by Demerjian et al. (2012). The final sample consists of 
1,568 distinct events. The details of sample exclusions are reported in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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We collect firm-level annual accounting data (at the balance sheet date immediately 
before the issue announcement) from the Compustat database. We also access the Thomson-
Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) database to collect institutional investors’ data as at the 
last quarter immediately before the issue announcement.  
Table 2 provides a summary composition of the final sample for the study. Specifically, 
Panel A shows the year-by-year and offering type-based distributions, Panel B presents 
information on the offering type, and Panel C reports a categorization by industry sectors. 
Several features in Table 2 are worth noting. The table shows that offerings are 
predominantly from the manufacturing industry with 629 observations (approx. 37.84% of 
the sample), while the retail industry is the next most strongly represented. As can be seen in 
Table 2, 88.02% of sample SEO offerings are firm commitment, while 11.98% are 
accelerated offerings. Given that the accelerated offering method is less commonly adopted 
by firms, it is particularly relevant to identify attributes correlated with its usage or otherwise. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 reports basic univariate descriptive statistics for the sample.1 We report sample 
mean and median values of key economic variables for two subgroups: accelerated and firm 
commitment SEOs. The table also presents the results for the non-parametric univariate test 
(Mann-Whitney [MW]) of the difference in median values between these two subgroups.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Several features are worthy of note from the comparison of accelerated versus firm 
commitment offerings. Specifically, relative to firm commitment offerings, firms with 
accelerated offerings have larger firm size (SIZE), market value (MV), and age (AGE), lower 
idiosyncratic risk (IDYRISK) in the year before the SEO offering announcement, higher 
liquidity (LIQUID) in the year before the issue announcement, lower standard deviation of 
                                                          
1 We present definitions of all the variables in the Appendix. 
10 
 
monthly returns (SDVOL) and earnings (SDEAR), greater leverage (LEVERAGE), higher 
institutional ownership (INSDED, INSQUASI, INSTRA), and a greater relative size of SEOs 
(OPTOTA). Thus, it is larger, older, and less risky firms, and firms more attractive to 
institutional investors, that tend to undertake accelerated SEOs.  
 
4.  Regression results 
4.1  Managerial ability and the issuance choice of SEOs 
This section investigates the impact of firm-level managerial ability on the firm issuance 
choice for SEOs by performing probit regressions of the SEO choice dummy on the 
managerial ability variables, controlling for firm-level factors. The probit regression model is 
given as: 
SEOchoicei,t = α + βMAi,t-1 + γControlsi,t-1 + εi,t   (1) 
where, SEOchoicei,t is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm undertakes an 
accelerated SEO, otherwise zero for firm commitment SEOs. We employ the managerial 
ability score developed by Demerjian et al. (2012) to proxy for managerial ability (MAi,t-1). At 
first, Demerjian et al. (2012) use the data envelopment analysis (DEA) technique to generate 
firm-level efficiency scores within a particular industry, where efficient firms are those that 
generate more revenues from a given set of resources (e.g., Cost of Goods Sold; Selling, 
General & Administrative Expense; Net Property Plant and Equipment; Net Operating 
Leases; Net Research and Development; Purchased Goodwill; and Other Intangible Assets). 
They specifically solve the optimization problem as follows: Firstly, the five variables, 
including Net Property Plant and Equipment; Net Operating Leases; Net Research and 
Development; Purchased Goodwill; and Other Intangible Assets are measured at the 
beginning of year t, while the two flow variables (Cost of Goods Sold and Selling, General & 
Administrative Expense) are measured over year t. They estimate DEA efficiency (total firm 
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efficiency) by industry group to identify efficiency levels for industries that have similar 
technologies and business models used to convert resources into outputs. Second, they 
regress the total firm efficiency score on various firm characteristics such as size, market 
share, cash availability, life cycle, operational complexity, and foreign operations to separate 
out the firm-specific efficiency factors from the total firm efficiency score. The residual, the 
total firm efficiency component unexplained by the firm characteristics, is attributed to 
managerial ability.  
This study further employs a number of other firm-level control variables (Controlsi,t-1) 
that could potentially influence firms’ SEO choices and, hence, they should be controlled for 
in a multivariate setting (e.g., Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005; Chemmanur et al., 2010; 
Demerjian et al., 2012, 2013). All control variables are measured over, or at the end of, the 
previous year, including firm size (SIZE), liquidity (LIQUID), risk (IDYRISK), relative issue 
size (OPTOTA), shelf offering (DSHELF, DSHELF_1), age (AGE), book-to-market ratio 
(BM), and leverage (LEVERAGE). The construction of the related variables is detailed in the 
Appendix. 
It is also noticed that one of the potential concerns in our analysis is endogeneity. We 
mitigate this issue by employing the one-lagged managerial ability measure and one-lagged 
control variables in all regressions. Year and industry dummies are also included to control 
for year- and industry-specific effects, respectively. We also estimate our model by using 
robust standard errors to account for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. 
Furthermore, the models across specifications are chosen after checking for multi-collinearity 
and model specification error. In the robustness analysis section, we also employ a number of 
other forms of analysis to specifically address the potential endogeneity of managerial ability. 
Table 4 presents the empirical analysis results for the relation between managerial ability 
and SEO issuance choice using various alternative specifications. As reported in a standard 
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regression (Model (1)) of Table 4, the coefficient for managerial ability (MA) is positive and 
statistically significant (beta coeff = 1.470 and p < 0.01). This result supports our main 
hypothesis that firms with higher managerial ability are more likely to undertake accelerated 
offerings. In terms of economic significance, firms with MA in the 75th percentile are 46% 
more likely to complete an accelerated SEO offering compared to those firms in the 25th 
percentile (that is, exp (1.080 x 0.06) / (exp (-1.080 x -0.13) = 0.461), controlling for other 
variables.  
We next conduct additional analyses on the impact of managerial ability, controlling for 
the full set of alternative specifications aimed at mitigating the influence of other indicated 
determinants of firms’ SEO issuance preferences. We report the results in Models (2) through 
(6) of Table 4. The coefficient for the MA variable is positive and statistically significant 
across all specifications, suggesting that firms with greater managerial ability are more likely 
to issue seasoned equity using the accelerated offer method. Overall, our result is consistent 
with the hypothesis, and supports the notion that higher managerial ability can act as a quality 
assurance mechanism that reduces the cost of due diligence associated with the equity issue 
process both from demand and supply side perspectives, and mitigates firm-level information 
asymmetry, and ultimately improving the information environment surrounding SEOs.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
It should also be noted that the results for the other firm-level variables that are 
statistically significant have the anticipated signs and are in line with the current literature. 
For instance, firms with greater size, higher leverage, and which have shelf offerings tend to 
use more accelerated offerings. We further find that firms that issue accelerated offerings, on 
average, have lower idiosyncratic risk and higher liquidity (see Models (3) and (4), 
respectively), though this effect disappears when all of the control variables are evaluated 
together in the one model (Model (6)). Generally, we find that larger firms and firms with 
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lower risk, higher leverage, greater liquidity, and higher-ability managers are more likely to 
undertake accelerated offerings.  
Further, it is possible that the effect of managerial ability on a firm’s SEO choice through 
reducing the degree of information asymmetry will vary for firms with different degrees of 
information asymmetry; for instance, this effect might be stronger for firms in industries with 
higher levels of information asymmetry (e.g., R&D intensive industries).2 In line with 
previous studies (Chang et al., 2006; Brown and Hillegeist, 2007; Bowen et al.; 2008; Kim et 
al., 2016; Dang et al., 2017), we use R&D intensive firms (R&DINTENSIVE), number of 
analysts following (ANALYSTS), and the dispersion of analyst forecasts (DISP), as proxies for 
firm information asymmetry level. Based on prior studies, R&D-intensive firms are defined 
as those operating in the chemicals and pharmaceuticals (SIC 28), machinery and computer 
hardware (SIC 35), electrical and electronics (SIC 36), and scientific instruments (SIC 38) 
sectors. We calculate analyst following as the average number of analysts making annual 
earnings forecasts over a 12-month period for a particular firm. We further calculate analyst 
forecast dispersion as the standard deviation of all earnings forecasts for the next fiscal year. 
We compute the analyst coverage and analyst dispersion measures using data from the 
Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S database.  
We sort all firms in our sample into two groups for each fiscal year: a high information 
environment group (that is, firms with low information asymmetry) and a low information 
environment group (high information asymmetry) based on the median values of financial 
analysts following and analyst forecast dispersion for each year, and R&D industry 
classification or otherwise. In the case of financial analysts, we define the high information 
environment group as firms having more analysts following than the median analysts 
following for each year of our sample (HighANALYSTS); whereas the low information 
                                                          
2 We thank the reviewer for this suggestion.  
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environment group is defined as firms having a lower than or equal to median level of  
analysts following (LowANALYSTS). Similarly, we classify firms into the high information 
environment category if they have a lower than median analyst forecast dispersion for each 
year (LowDISP) and the low information environment category contains firms with higher 
than or equal to the median level of analyst forecast dispersion (HighDISP). Since we argue 
that managerial ability reduces firm-level information asymmetry, we posit that the 
relationship between managerial ability and the accelerating SEO offering method choice 
would be more pronounced for firms with greater information asymmetry. The results are 
presented in Panels A, B and C of Table 5 using each of the three proxies for information 
asymmetry, and including year and industry effects. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 5 shows that the relation between managerial ability and SEO method choice is 
dependent on the degree of information asymmetry inherent in firms. Overall, we find 
supportive evidence indicating that the degree of a particular firm’s information asymmetry 
plays an important role in the articulation between managerial ability and equity offering 
decisions. We find a significant positive relation between managerial ability and the 
likelihood of undertaking an accelerated SEO for firms with high information asymmetry 
across all information asymmetry proxies (LowANALYSTS group, HighDISP group, and 
firms in R&D intensive industries), but no relationship between managerial ability and SEO 
financing method preference for firms classified as having a high information environment 
(low information asymmetry). This suggests that higher managerial ability moderates the 
effect of a weaker information environment, such as from the viewpoint of underwriters or 
investors, and facilitates the ability of firms to execute the quicker accelerated SEO process. 
For firms with less information asymmetry, these results similarly suggest that other quality 
and certification signaling is less important in determining SEO financing choice.  
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4.2  Endogeneity of Managerial Ability 
We conduct some additional analysis to address concerns around the potential 
endogeneity of managerial quality. First, we employ a propensity score matching procedure 
to obtain a sample of firms with a similar likelihood of employing managers with different 
ability. We consider high ability managers as the top quintile of managerial ability, and low 
ability managers as the bottom quintile of managerial ability, and examine differences 
between the two groups’ SEO issuance decisions before and after matching. We create a 
control group based on propensity score matching using firm-level characteristics. Thus, the 
treatment and the control firms are nearly identical along all dimensions, except one, i.e. 
managerial ability. We then examine the relation between managerial ability and the SEO 
choice for this matched sample of firms. The results are reported in Table 6 and, again, 
support our prior findings that higher ability managers are more likely to undertake 
accelerated seasoned equity offerings and less likely to engage in firm commitment offerings. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Second, it is possible that the observed relation between managerial ability and the 
accelerated offering decision is driven by the presence of time-invariant firm-specific omitted 
variables, potentially leading to an under-specification bias. We mitigate this concern by 
performing an additional robustness check using firm fixed effects, and report the results in 
Table 7. The results show that the coefficient for the MA variable is still positive and 
statistically significant across all specifications, suggesting that firm accelerated SEO 
issuance decisions are positively associated with firm-level managerial ability attributed. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
As a further robustness test to control for potential endogeneity, we conduct instrumental 
variable regressions examining the relationship between managerial ability and firms’ equity 
offering choices, controlling for any reverse causality. In the first-stage regression, we 
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employ an ordinary least squares model to predict firm-level managerial ability (Panel A of 
Table 8). In the second-stage regression, we examine the relationship with the SEO choice 
variable of the managerial ability predicted (EXMA) variable from the first-stage regression 
and other controls used in our baseline regression (Panel B of Table 8). We employ an 
instrumental variable that is expected to be relate to firm-level managerial ability but should 
not be directly associated with firm SEO choices. Our instrumental variable is the Industry-
median MA Score (based on SIC 2 digit industry classification). Each industry includes a 
large number of firms and, thus, a shock to managerial ability at the industry level should be 
exogenous. Industry-level managerial ability is expected to be related to managerial ability at 
a firm-level (such as a manager taking actions to enhance their capabilities relative to 
industry peers, which their performance and remuneration, for instance, may be evaluated 
against), but there is no plausible reason why industry-wide average or median ability should 
be related to firm-level financing decision-making. As such, the industry-median MA score 
should be a suitable instrument for the purposes of this analysis. We use the predicted value 
(EXMA) in the second stage (Panel B of Table 8) to predict SEO issuance preferences. The 
first stage results in Panel A of Table 8 show that industry-median MA score is a highly 
statistically significant predictor of firm-level managerial ability. The second stage results in 
Panel B show that the sign of coefficient on the EXMA variable is consistent with those in the 
baseline regressions, suggesting that the positive association between firm-level managerial 
ability and SEO issuance decisions remains qualitatively and statistically (if anything, more 
highly significant) similar after controlling for endogeneity issues. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Overall, this additional analysis suggests that the significant positive relation between 
managerial ability and firm likelihood of undertaking accelerated offerings is robust to 
endogeneity concerns. These results support our hypothesis that managerial ability reduces 
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information asymmetry, and firms with higher managerial ability are more likely to undertake 
accelerated equity offerings. 
4.3  Managerial ability, corporate governance, and SEO issuance choice 
In this section, we examine the role of managerial ability on the equity issuance 
preferences between accelerated versus firm commitment SEOs controlling for various 
corporate governance characteristics. Corporate governance is a primary mechanism for 
ensuring reporting transparency, reducing information asymmetry, improving stock price 
informativeness, and corporate governance plays a positive role in creating shareholder 
wealth. Koerniadi et al. (2012) find that better corporate governance strengthens the 
disciplinary threat of removing the management and, therefore, limits the extent to which 
management can expropriate firm value through shirking, empire building, overconsumption 
of perquisites, and risk aversion. 
We examine two corporate governance attributes that are perceived to be associated with 
firm decision-making processes and firm-level monitoring and agency (information 
asymmetry) environments. These are the existence of CEO and chairperson duality (termed 
CEO duality) and the level and type of institution ownership present in sample firms. If these 
governance attributes influence the information environment and monitoring effectiveness 
(negatively in the case of CEO duality and positively in the case of greater institutional 
ownership), then through the information asymmetry channel they should have moderating 
roles on the managerial ability and SEO choice relationship. 
It is well-accepted in the corporate governance literature that the existence of CEO 
duality, independent of underlying CEO ability, may create significant agency problems 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983).3 Fama and Jensen (1983) document that, among others, CEO 
                                                          
3 According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen and Ruback (1983), the agency costs which result due to 
the mismatch in the interests of shareholders and managers can reduce as top management ownership increases, 
because the personal interests of the CEOs are more inclined to converge with those of the shareholders when 
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duality is linked to a low level of analyst coverage and, hence, a weaker firm information 
environment, other things being equal. They also find that CEO duality is more prominent in 
firms with higher R&D expenditure, more advertising expenditure, and lower product market 
competition. The opacity in the firm-level information environment resulting from CEO 
duality is further aided since CEO replacement is more unlikely in the case of poorly 
performing CEOs when they hold duality positions (Goyal and Park, 2002). Moreover, CEO 
duality is also likely to entrench themselves against accountability (Finkelstein and D’aveni, 
1994), leading to negative agency and valuation consequences resulting from entrenchment. 
Following this line of argument, Mallette and Hogler (1995) show that firms with 
independent chairman are less likely to adopt liability protection for their directors. 
Sundaramurthy (1996) shows that the adoption of antitakeover measures, including unequal 
voting rights, fair price provisions, classified board provisions, and supermajority voting 
requirements, among others, tends to occur in firms with CEO duality. CEO duality also 
compromises the monitoring effectiveness of the board. Tuggle et al. (2010) find that boards 
vary in their monitoring activity and that CEO duality is a strong contributor to this variance. 
Overall, CEO-chair duality can provide control of the board agenda and information flow so 
as to create norms in which questioning management effectiveness is deemed inappropriate 
(McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999).  
Given the due diligence requirements and time constraint associated with the execution of 
accelerated SEOs, the control over information flow and creation of an opaque information 
environment when the firm’s CEO also holds the position of the chairperson of the board 
may be an impediment to the ability of the firm to employ this offer method to raise seasoned 
equity. Therefore, we examine whether the positive signalling and certification effects 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
managerial shareholdings increase. Recently, Croci and Petmezas (2015) examine the effect of risk-taking 
incentives on acquisition investments and find that the bidder CEOs exposed to risk-taking incentives are more 
likely to conduct risky investments. 
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associated with managerial ability and the related decision-making about SEO method choice 
persist in the presence of CEO-chair duality. We also interact the MA variable with the 
CEODUAL variable to investigate if CEO duality status has a moderating influence on the 
positive relation between managerial ability and SEO issuance decisions. Accordingly, we 
estimate Equation (3) below, and report the regression results in Models (1) through (4) of 
Table 9. Our regression model is given as follows: 
SEOchoicei,t = α + βMAi,t-1 + δCEODUALi,t-1 + ϑMA*CEODUALi,t-1 + γControlsi,t-1 + εi,t   (3) 
Controlling for the presence of CEO duality in the models in Table 9, we find that the MA 
variable maintains its significant positive association with the accelerated offering likelihood 
indicator, albeit at the 10% level. Further, the coefficient on the CEODUAL variable is 
negative and statistically significant, indicating that firms with CEO duality are less (more) 
likely to undertake accelerated (firm commitment) SEOs. More importantly, we interact the 
MA variable with the CEODUAL variable and document that the coefficient on the 
MA*CEODUAL interaction term is positive and statistically significant. This result indicates 
that the incremental effect of CEO duality as a negative quality certification on firms’ 
information environment tends is less in the case of firms where the CEO has higher assessed 
ability. In this sense, firms with higher managerial ability, despite having the dual CEO-
chairman position, are more likely to choose the accelerated offering method, supporting the 
prediction from the main hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
In relation to institutional ownership, existing evidence indicates that institutional 
shareholders who hold large ownership stakes are more likely to affect corporate decisions 
and use their increased monitoring capacity to re-adjust the interests of shareholders and 
managers, leading to the reduction in information asymmetry and agency costs (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Gillan and Starks, 2003; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; 
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Tihanyi et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2007; Dalton et al., 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Ferreira 
et al., 2010; and Aggarwal et al., 2011). 
In terms of SEOs, Gibson et al. (2004) identify an important role played by institutional 
investment in seasoned equity issuances. Chemmanur et al. (2009) and Burns et al. (2010) 
document that institutional investors have the ability to prevent value-dissipating activities 
within a firm, and increased institutional participation conveys positve news about the long-
term prospects of the firm. More importantly, they find that firm SEOs have a lower offer 
price discount compared to other offerings. Hao (2014) finds that the more short-term 
oriented the shareholders are, the more likely an equity issuance decision will be made. 
However, all of the various types of institutional investors do not necessarily have the same 
objective function. In fact, Bushee (2001) states that the quasi-indexer and dedicated 
institutions provide stable long-term ownership since they are interested in long-term income 
and capital appreciation. Nonetheless, given that the need for increased quality certification is 
more important in the case of accelerated SEOs, firm-level managerial ability may be less 
important in the presence of external quality certification in the form of institutional investor 
ownership, and particularly higher levels of dedicated and active institutional ownership. 
Therefore, we conduct a set of tests to investigate the link between managerial ability and 
issuance choice of SEOs controlling for the presence of institutional investors. In order to 
proxy for institutional ownership, we employ a number of different institutional investor 
characteristics, including total institutional ownership, dedicated institutional ownership, 
transient institutional ownership, and active institutional ownership. Bushee (2001) contends 
that both dedicated and quasiindexer institutions provide stable long-term ownership and are 
interested in long-term income and capital appreciation. From a managerial and firm 
monitoring point of view, we classify institutions that fall in the quasi-indexers or dedicated 
groups as active institutional investors. Table 10 reports the regression results of the 
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association between managerial ability and SEO issuance decisions controlling for 
institutional ownership (Panel A), dedicated institutional ownership (Panel B), transient 
institutional ownership (Panel C), and active institutional ownership (Panel D). We further 
combine together these institutional investor ownership types in a full model and present the 
results in Panel (E). 
 [Insert Table 10 here] 
The results show that the coefficient for the MA variable is positive and statistically 
significant at the conventional significant levels across all panels and specifications after 
controlling for institutional ownership. These results support the main hypothesis that firms 
with higher managerial ability are more likely to undertake accelerated offerings. 
It is also pertinent to notice that the institutional ownership variables have no significant 
association with firm equity offering decisions. This is somewhat surprising given that firm 
equity issues have the potential to modify institutional ownership levels, subject to issue 
method used and institutional investor participation. It may be that institutional investor 
monitor or activism does not extend to the level of corporate financing decision-making, 
unless they take on board seats which is uncommon, or that the specific issue method chosen 
doesn’t significantly impact on ownership or valuation outcomes for institutional investors. 
Alternatively, it may be that institutional investors rely on the expertise of underwriters in 
advising on the preferred issue method, and they may wish to avoid conflict of interest 
considerations in their capacity as firm shareholders. 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper examines the effects of managerial ability on the issuance method choice for firm 
SEOs in the U.S. equity market for the period of 2001 to 2013, and finds some new evidence. 
First, firms with higher managerial ability choose, or are more likely, to undertake 
accelerated SEOs in preference to firm commitment offerings. This result is consistent with 
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the view that skilled managers can clearly convey a firm’s intrinsic value to the capital 
market, thus reducing the information asymmetry associated with firms, and around SEO 
offerings, better facilitating the adoption of the accelerated SEO method. Second, firms with 
higher managerial ability provide a certification function for the market and offer 
participants, and particularly reducing the effort required for due diligence activities on the 
part of underwriters, vis-à-vis lowering transaction costs and execution speed for accelerated 
offerings. Our findings are robust to approaches that are designed to mitigate any endogeneity 
bias between managerial ability and SEO issuance decisions. Furthermore, we find that the 
positive relation between managerial ability and SEO offering choice persists after 
controlling for a number of corporate governance mechanisms influencing firm-level 
information and agency environments.  
The findings in this study have important implications for investors and policy-setting 
bodies. Firstly, they document the direct association of managerial ability with financing 
decision-making tasks, and expand on the literature relating managerial ability to firm-level 
performance and outcomes. Furthermore, the findings suggest that managerial ability 
influences the actions and decisions of firm stakeholders, and particularly underwriters in the 
case of SEO planning and execution. Other stakeholders, such as shareholders and lenders 
should similarly incorporate assessment of managerial ability as a component of their 
information and decision-making set. This is further emphasised based on the implication that 
managerial ability can mitigate firm-level information asymmetry, independent of other 
governance or monitoring mechanisms in place at the firm-level. This latter finding should 
also be of interest to policy makers in terms of disclosure and compliance requirements 
related to equity issue processes and mandatory corporate governance code development, 
particularly in regards to managerial attributes, experience and expertise. 
  
 
Appendix: Variable definitions 
Variables Acronym Description Data sources 
1. SEO choice, Managerial ability, and CEO duality   
SEO issuance choice SEOchoice A dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm offers accelerated SEOs, otherwise zero 
for firm commitment SEOs. 
SDC 
Managerial ability MA Firm-level managerial ability score developed by Demerjian et al. (2012). Demerjian et al. (2012) 
2. Other firm-level characteristics     
Firm size SIZE Log of the book value of total assets. Compustat 
Market value MV The market value of the company one month prior to the announcement  
Book-to-market ratio BM Total assets/(Total assets-book value of equity + market value of equity). Compustat 
Liquidity LIQUID Logarithm of average proportionate bid-ask spread for one-year period prior to the 
announcement of SEO offerings. 
CRSP 
Idiosyncratic risk IDYRISK The standard error for the 1-year period before the announcement date (return from day -260 
today -2). 
SDC 
Standand deviation of returns SDVOL Standard deviation of average monthly returns CRSP 
Standard deviation of earnings SDEAR Standard deviation of the EBITDA/Assets ratio over the previous 10-year period  CRSP 
Relative issue size OPTOTA Offer proceeds relative to total assets. SDC 
Shelf offerings DSHELF A dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 for a shelf offering, and zero otherwise SDC 
Shelf offerings  DSHELF_1 A dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 for offerings which satisfy shelf offering 
requirements, and zero otherwise 
SDC 
Firm age AGE Logarithm of age where age of the firm is measured in years since the firm entered the 
Compustat. 
Compustat 
Leverage LEVERAGE The ratio of total debt to total assets. Compustat 
Independent directors INDEP The percentage of non-executive directors on the board. GMI Rating 
Board size BSIZE Logarithm of the number of board members. GMI Rating 
Board meetings BMEETS Logarithm of the number of board annual meetings. GMI Rating 
Female directors DGENDER A dummy variable which takes a value of one if at least one female director in the board and 
zero otherwise. 
GMI Rating 
CEO duality CEODUAL A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if CEO is also the chairman of the board at the time 
of the issue, and zero otherwise. 
GMI Rating 
Institutional ownership INSOWN Institutional ownership to share outstanding at the last quarter immediately prior to the 
announcement 
13-F Thomson Reuters 
Dedicated institutional investors INSDED The number of shares held by dedicated institutional investors divided by the total number of 
shares outstanding in the firm 
GMI Rating 
Active institutional investors INSACTIVE The number of shares held by quasi institutional investors and dedicated investors divided by 
the total number of shares outstanding in the firm 
GMI Rating 
Transient institutional investors INSTRA The number of shares held by transient institutional investors divided by the total number of 
shares outstanding in the firm 
GMI Rating 
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Table 1: Summary of sample selection and data filtering 
Reason for Sample Exclusion No. of offerings 
Initial Sample of US SEOs  17,289 
   Less Exclusions  
- Without Shelf offering details 7,433 
- IPO offering 1,917 
- Duplication offering 1,668 
- American Depositary Share (ADS) 02 
- Warrants 182 
- Convertible Bonds 435 
- Preference shares 52 
- Trust Units 513 
- Units 680 
- Without Firm codes/announcement details 220 
- Without Total asset and Market Value 655 
- Without Return Series Data for one year 530 
- Without Offering Proceeds Data in SDC 366 
- Without MA measure 974 
- Rights offering and Private Placement 094 
   Total Exclusions 15,771 
Final Sample 1,568 
 
Table 2: Summary of sample selection and distribution 
Panel A provides year-wise distribution of accelerated SEOs and firm commitment SEOs in the period 2001-
2013. Panel B reports percentage distribution of SEOs in our final sample. Panel C provides industry-wise 
distribution of SEO offerings.  
 
Panel A: Year-wise classification 
Year Accelerated SEOs Firm Commitment SEOs Total 
2001 6 88 94 
2002 11 114 125 
2003 22 139 161 
2004 31 118 149 
2005 18 86 104 
2006 13 92 105 
2007 5 103 108 
2008 5 69 74 
2009 5 166 171 
2010 9 122 131 
2011 20 105 125 
2012 22 104 126 
2013 21 74 095 
Total 188 1,380 1,568 
Panel B: Type of SEO offering 
Types of offering Total  In Percentage (%) 
Accelerated offering 188 11.98 
Firm Commitment 1380 88.02 
Panel C: Industry-based classification 
Industry Total  In Percentage (%) 
Service  9 0.54 
Agriculture 219 13.17 
Transportation 92 5.56 
Construction 361 21.72 
Finance 60 3.61 
Manufacturing 629 37.84 
Mining 39 2.34 
Retail 252 15.16 
Wholesale 1 0.06 
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Table 3: SEOs issuance decisions and firm characteristics 
This table reports summary statistics of firm-level financial characteristics related to accelerated versus firm 
commitment SEOs in our sample. The table also provides nonparametric test statistics, the Mann-Whitney 
(MW) test for the difference in median values across the two groups of SEOs. These firm-level financial 
characteristics are the following: SIZE, the total assets at the balance sheet date immediately prior to the 
announcement date; MV, the market value of the issuing firm one month prior to the announcement; 
LEVERAGE, the ratio of the total debt to total assets; BM, the book-to-market ratio measured as the ratio of the 
book value of assets to market value of assets; AGE, the company age from its listing date (years); SDVOL, 
standard deviation of monthly return calculated for each firm each year; SDEAR, standard deviation of EBITDA 
to asset ratio over a 10-year period; ATGROWTH, change in the log of total assets; PREPBA1YR, average 
proportionate bid-ask spread for one year period prior to the announcement; TANGIBILITY, Net PPE-to-assets 
ratio; MA, managerial ability measure constructed by Demerjian et al. (2012); OP, offering proceeds; OPTOTA, 
offer proceeds relative to total assets; PREPRICE, median monthly closing prices over a 12-month period; 
IDYRISK, the standard error for the 1-year period before the announcement date (return from day t-260 today t-
2); TACCURAL, total accruals; CEODUAL, a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the CEO of the 
firm is also the chairman of the board; BSIZE, the number of board members; INDEP, the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board. BMEETS, the total number of board meetings in a year; DGENDER, a dummy 
variable which takes a value of one if there is at least one female director on the board and zero otherwise; 
INSDED, the number of shares held by dedicated institutional investors divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding in the firm; INSQUASI, the number of shares held by quasi institutional investors divided by the 
total number of shares outstanding in the firm; INSTRA, the number of shares held by transient institutional 
investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding in the firm. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Variables Statistics Accelerated 
SEOs 
Firm 
Commitment 
SEOs 
MW test  
 
SIZE ($m) Mean  4724.14 2374.04  
 Median 793.23 300.86 6.05*** 
MV ($m) Mean  2302.61 1768.46  
 Median  724.20 391.96 5.58*** 
LEVERAGE Mean  34.36 25.67  
 Median  31.77 20.60 4.11*** 
BM Mean  0.62 0.58  
 Median 0.66 0.55 2.43** 
AGE Mean  13.43 11.65  
 Median 8.59 7.79 1.98** 
SDVOL Mean 0.03 0.04  
 Median  0.02 0.03 5.76*** 
SDEAR Mean  -0.08 -0.09  
 Median  0.04 0.03 0.90 
ATGROWTH Mean  19.23 18.79  
 Median  12.54 9.88 0.51 
PREPBA1YR Mean  0.71 1.17  
 Median 0.32 0.65 5.90*** 
TANGIBILITY Mean  30.79 26.30  
 Median  19.10 15.33 0.95 
MA Mean  0.02 -0.03  
 Median -0.02 -0.04 1.05 
OP ($m) Mean  219.73 188.14  
 Median  119.95 90.00 4.68*** 
PREPRICE Mean  20.13 17.10  
 Median 16.00 12.52 2.74*** 
IDYRISK Mean  0.02 0.03  
 Median 0.02 0.03 6.45*** 
INSOWN Mean  41.56 36.22  
 Median  40.60 30.64 1.16 
TACCURAL Mean  -0.09 -0.10  
 Median -0.05 -0.07 2.04** 
OPTOTA Mean  37.04 51.33  
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 Median  18.40 28.71 4.61*** 
INSDED Mean  18.60 8.02  
 Median  15.96 6.23 4.32*** 
INSQUASI Mean  23.54 19.54  
 Median  20.89 17.24 3.65*** 
INSTRA Mean  16.54 17.05  
 Median  15.41 15.23 1.87* 
CEODUAL Mean  0.63 0.62  
 Median  1.00 1.00 1.03 
INDEP Mean  57.08 56.25  
 Median  58.00 56.50 1.22 
BSIZE Mean 14.63 14.59  
 Median 13.00 13.00                  2.57** 
BMEETS Mean  1.87 1.23  
 Median  1.00 1.00 0.89 
DGENDER Mean  1.00 1.00  
 Median  0.76 0.87 0.23 
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Table 4: Managerial ability and SEO issuance decisions 
This table presents the empirical analysis results of the relation between firm-level managerial ability and SEO 
issuance decisions. The empirical probit model is given as: 
SEOchoicei,t = α + βMAi,t-1 + γControlsi,t-1 + εi,t   (1) 
where, SEOchoicei,t is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm offers accelerated SEOs, otherwise 
zero for firm commitment SEOs. We employ the managerial ability score developed by Demerjian et al. (2012) 
to proxy for managerial ability (MAi,t-1). This study further employs a number of other firm-level control 
variables (Controlsi,t-1) that could potentially influence firms’ SEO choices. All control variables are measured 
over or at the end of the previous year, and winsorized at 1%, including firm size (SIZE), liquidity (LIQUID), 
risk (IDYRISK), relative issue size (OPTOTA), shelf offering (DSHELF, DSHELF_1), age (AGE), book-to-
market ratio (BM), and leverage (LEVERAGE). The construction of the related variables is detailed in the 
Appendix. Year and industry dummies are also included to control for year-industry fixed effects. The z-
statistics shown in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Accelerated SEOs vs. Firm Commitment SEOs 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MA 1.470 1.114 1.311 1.306 1.534 1.080 
  (3.51)*** (2.52)** (2.98)*** (2.97)*** (3.57)*** (2.43)** 
SIZE 
 
0.292 
   
0.207 
  
 
(4.47)*** 
   
(2.17)** 
LIQUID 
  
-0.395 
  
-0.153 
  
  
(-4.10)*** 
  
(-1.10) 
IDYRISK 
   
-16.110 
 
-3.854 
  
   
(-2.48)** 
 
(-0.65) 
OPTOTA 
    
-0.221 -0.002 
  
    
(-0.93) (-0.02) 
DSHELF 
 
1.074 1.226 1.413 1.515 1.016 
  
 
(1.88)* (2.15)** (2.51)** (2.61)*** (1.75)* 
AGE 
 
0.042 0.068 0.083 0.098 0.0422 
  
 
(0.49) (0.79) (0.98) (1.14) (0.49) 
BM 
 
0.022 0.424 0.289 0.232 0.135 
  
 
(0.11) (2.26)** (1.54) (1.10) (0.57) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.587 0.827 0.904 0.875 0.646 
  
 
(1.89)* (2.75)*** (3.11)*** (3.09)*** (2.06)** 
DSHELF_1 
 
-0.782 -0.635 -0.486 -0.394 -0.836 
  
 
(-1.30) (-1.04) (-0.79) (-0.63) (-1.36) 
CONSTANT -1.104 -3.811 -2.216 -1.958 -2.638 -3.081 
  (-1.01) (-3.76)*** (-2.19)** (-1.84)* (-2.51)** (-2.69)*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.070 0.164 0.160 0.152 0.147 0.166 
Fixed effects YI YI YI YI YI YI 
Obs 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 
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Table 5: Information environments, managerial ability and SEO decisions 
This table reports the impact of the degree of information asymmetry on the relation between managerial ability 
and accelerated offering decisions. We use analyst coverage, firm R&D Intensity, and analyst dispersion, as 
proxies for information asymmetry. We sort all firms in our sample into three groups for each fiscal year: a high 
information environment group (that is, with low information asymmetry) and a low information environment 
group (high information asymmetry) based on the median values of financial analysts following and analyst 
forecast dispersion for each year, and an R&D intensive industry or otherwise classification. In the case of 
financial analysts, we define the high information environment group as firms having more analysts following 
than the median analysts following for each year of our sample (HighANALYSTS) whereas the low information 
environment group is defined as firms having a lower than or equal to median analysts following 
(LowANALYSTS). Similarly, we classify firms into the high information environment category for firms with 
lower than median analyst forecast dispersion for each year (LowDISP) and the low information environment 
category contains firms with higher than or equal to the median (HighDISP). R&D intensive firms are classified 
as firms operating in the chemical and pharmaceutical, machinery and computer hardware, electricity and 
electronics and scientific instruments industries. We employ the managerial ability score developed by 
Demerjian et al. (2012) to proxy for managerial ability (MAi,t-1). We further employ a number of other firm-level 
control variables (Controlsi,t-1) that could potentially influence firms’ SEO choices. All control variables are 
measured over or at the end of the previous year, and winsorized at 1% and 99% levels, including firm size 
(SIZE), liquidity (LIQUID), risk (IDYRISK), relative issue size (OPTOTA), shelf offering (DSHELF, 
DSHELF_1), age (AGE), book-to-market ratio (BM), and leverage (LEVERAGE). The construction of the 
related variables is detailed in the Appendix. Year and industry dummies are also included to control for year-
industry fixed effects. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
Panel A: R&D Intensive Industry  
Variables R&DINTENSIVE  Non-R&DINTENSIVE 
MA 0.608 0.060 
 (2.02)** (0.12) 
CONSTANT -2.375 -2.386 
 (-3.29)*** (-3.03)*** 
All control variables Yes Yes 
Fixed effects YI YI 
Pseudo R2 0.215 0.154 
Obs 645 923 
Panel B: Financial analysts 
 HighANALYSTS LowANALYSTS 
MA 0.432 0.953 
 (1.38) (2.75)*** 
CONSTANT -3.089 -3.385 
 (-4.18)*** (-3.62)*** 
All control variables Yes Yes 
Fixed effects YI YI 
Pseudo R2 0.181 0.211 
Obs 886 631 
Panel C: Analysts forecast dispersion 
 HighDISP LowDISP 
MA 0.491 0.306 
 (2.64)*** (1.09) 
CONSTANT -3.403 -2.754 
 (-5.62)*** (-2.74)*** 
All control variables Yes Yes 
Fixed effects YI YI 
Pseudo R2 0.249 0.150 
Obs 561 860 
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Table 6: PSM approach to address endogeneity 
This table presents the empirical analysis results of propensity score matching (PSM) approach to examine 
whether firms with higher managerial ability prefer accelerated offering decision. We use the yearly two-digit 
SIC industry median of the managerial ability measures as the cut-off value and define firms with high (low) 
managerial ability as those with above- (below-) median managerial ability. The propensity score matching 
procedure is employed to obtain a sample of firms with a similar likelihood of employing managers with 
different ability. We consider high ability managers as the top quintile of managerial ability, and low ability 
managers as the bottom quintile of managerial ability, and examine differences between the two groups’ SEO 
issuance decisions before and after matching. We create a control group based on propensity score matching 
using firm-level characteristics. Firms with high managerial ability are our treatment firms, whereas firms with 
low managerial ability are our control firms. We then examine the relation between managerial ability and the 
SEO choice for this matched sample of firms. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
High ability Managers vs. low ability Managers 0.452 
 (3.05)*** 
Pseudo R2  0.1737 
Number of firm-year observations in the treatment group 744 
 
Table 7: Impact of managerial ability on the issuance choice of SEOs using firm-fixed 
effect models 
This table presents the empirical analysis results of the relation between firm-level managerial ability and SEO 
issuance decisions using firm-fixed effect models. The dependent variable, SEOchoicei,t is a dummy variable 
taking the value of one if the firm offers accelerated SEOs, otherwise zero for firm commitment SEOs. We 
employ the managerial ability score developed by Demerjian et al. (2012) to proxy for managerial ability (MAi,t-
1). This study further employs a number of other firm-level control variables (Controlsi,t-1) that could potentially 
influence firms’ SEO choices. All control variables are measured over or at the end of the previous year, and 
winsorized at 1%, including firm size (SIZE), liquidity (LIQUID), risk (IDYRISK), relative issue size 
(OPTOTA), shelf offering (DSHELF, DSHELF_1), age (AGE), book-to-market ratio (BM), and leverage 
(LEVERAGE). The construction of the related variables is detailed in the Appendix. The z-statistics shown in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MA 1.554 1.223 1.525 1.430 1.658 1.179 
  (3.49)*** (2.61)*** (3.33)*** (3.03)*** (3.59)*** (2.50)**  
SIZE   0.293       0.248 
    (4.26)***       (3.03)*** 
LIQUID     -0.300     -0.073 
      (-2.54)**     (-0.62)   
IDYRISK       -16.061   -4.983 
        (-2.47)**   (-0.76)   
OPTOTA         -0.196 -0.017 
     (-1.09) (-0.13) 
DSHELF   1.796 1.807 1.874 1.907 1.777 
    (6.02)*** (6.09)*** (6.27)*** (6.36)*** (5.94)*** 
AGE   0.030 0.087 0.074 0.090 0.032 
    (0.33) (0.97) (0.81) (0.98) (0.36)   
BM   0.010 0.398 0.286 0.244 0.066 
    (0.05) (2.23)** (1.58) (1.25) (0.32)   
LEVERAGE   0.666 0.945 0.994 0.978 0.699 
    (1.97)** (2.95)*** (3.10)*** (3.03)*** (2.06)**  
DSHELF_1 -0.624 -0.910 -0.401 -0.565 -0.774 -0.727 
  (-1.35) (-1.57) (-0.69) (-0.97) (-1.34) (-1.20)   
CONSTANT -2.839 -6.383 -3.675 -3.702 -4.320 -5.717 
  (-5.07)*** (-7.31)*** (-5.24)*** (-5.17)*** (-6.33)*** (-5.37)*** 
Fixed effects FYI FYI FYI FYI FYI FYI 
Wald Chi 2 60.25*** 109.50*** 107.19*** 104.75*** 102.52*** 109.98*** 
Obs       1,568  1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 
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Table 8: Managerial ability, endogeneity and equity issuance choice 
This table presents the empirical analysis results of the relation between managerial ability and SEO issuance 
decisions using instrumental variable regressions. In the first-stage regression, we employ an ordinary least 
squares model to predict the managerial ability. In the second-stage regression, we examine the SEO choice 
using the managerial ability predicted from the first-stage regression and other controls used in our baseline 
regression. We employ an instrumental variable that relates to the firm’s managerial ability but are directly 
driving its SEO choice. Our instrumental variable is the Industry-median MA Score (based on SIC 2 digit 
industry classification). The main test variable in the second-stage regression is predicted MA (EXMA). We 
report the results for the first-stage regression in Panel A, and the second stage in Panel B. All control variables 
are measured over or at the end of the previous year, and winsorized at 1%, including firm size (SIZE), liquidity 
(LIQUID), risk (IDYRISK), relative issue size (OPTOTA), shelf offering (DSHELF, DSHELF_1), age (AGE), 
book-to-market ratio (BM), and leverage (LEVERAGE). The construction of the related variables is detailed in 
the Appendix. The z-statistics shown in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. The symbols ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: First-stage regression on the relation between 
MA and Industry-median MA Score 
Industry-median MA Score 0.959 
  (37.30)*** 
SIZE 0.019 
  (5.96)*** 
LIQUID 0.009 
  (2.95)*** 
IDYRISK -0.666 
  (-2.74)*** 
OPTOTA 0.004 
  (1.21)   
DSHELF -0.018 
  (-2.23)**  
BM -0.028 
  (-3.50)*** 
LEVERAGE -0.046 
  (-3.65)*** 
DSHELF_1 0.003 
  (0.15)   
CONSTANT -0.119 
  (-3.64)*** 
Fixed effects YI  
R2 0.471 
Obs 1,568 
 
Panel B: Second-stage regression on the relation between predicted MA and SEO issuance decisions 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EXMA 1.641 1.432 1.760 1.686 1.847 1.414 
  (5.05)*** (3.92)*** (4.97)*** (4.66)*** (5.25)*** (3.81)*** 
SIZE   0.125       0.108 
    (3.61)***       (2.58)*** 
LIQUID     -0.112     -0.031 
      (-2.19)**     (-0.58)   
IDYRISK       -5.623   -1.496 
        (-1.85)*   (-0.47)   
OPTOTA         -0.072 0.007 
          (-0.91) (0.11)   
DSHELF   0.915 0.922 0.948 0.961 0.906 
    (6.72)*** (6.81)*** (7.04)*** (7.13)*** (6.64)*** 
DSHELF_1   -0.629 -0.469 -0.485 -0.550 -0.586 
    (-2.19)** (-1.66)* (-1.73)* (-1.94)* (-2.01)**  
AGE   0.007 0.030 0.025 0.029 0.009 
    (0.16) (0.65) (0.54) (0.64) (0.20)   
34 
 
BM   0.004 0.160 0.125 0.104 0.028 
    (0.04) (1.82)* (1.43) (1.11) (0.28)   
LEVERAGE   0.381 0.514 0.530 0.521 0.394 
    (2.26)** (3.20)*** (3.32)*** (3.24)*** (2.32)**  
CONSTANT -1.516 -3.152 -2.038 -2.041 -2.268 -2.905 
  (-6.05)*** (-7.80)*** (-6.19)*** (-6.05)*** (-7.22)*** (-5.71)*** 
Fixed effects YI YI YI YI YI YI 
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.169 0.163 0.161 0.159 0.170 
Obs 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 
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Table 9: Managerial ability, CEO duality, and SEO issuance choice 
This table presents the empirical analysis results of the relation between managerial ability in association with 
CEO duality and SEO issuance decisions. We interact the MA variable with the CEODUAL variable to 
investigate if CEO duality status affects the positive relation between managerial ability and SEO issuance 
decisions. Our regression model is given as follows: 
SEOchoicei,t = α + βMAi,t-1 + δCEODUALi,t-1 + ϑMA*CEODUALi,t-1 + γControlsi,t-1 + εi,t      (3) 
where, SEOchoicei,t is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm offers accelerated SEOs, otherwise 
zero for firm commitment SEOs. We employ the managerial ability score developed by Demerjian et al. (2012) 
to proxy for managerial ability (MAi,t-1). CEODUALi,t-1 is a dummy variable taking the value of one if CEO is 
also the chairman of the board at the time of the issue, and zero otherwise. Controli,t-1 denotes the control proxies 
of firm i in each year t-1, which includes firm size (SIZE), liquidity (LIQUID), risk (IDYRISK), relative issue 
size (OPTOTA), shelf offering (DSHELF, DSHELF_1), age (AGE), book-to-market ratio (BM), and leverage 
(LEVERAGE). We further employ a number of additional firm-level control variables to proxy for corporate 
governance mechanism, including independent directors (INDEP), board size (BSIZE), board meeting 
(BMEETS), female director (DGENDER), and institutional investors (INSOWN). The construction of the related 
variables is detailed in the Appendix. Year and industry dummies are also included to control for year-industry 
fixed effects. The z-statistics shown in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. The symbols ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Accelerated SEOs vs. Firm Commitment SEOs 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MA 1.661  1.751 0.898 
  (2.95)***  (3.13)*** (2.12)** 
CEODUAL  -0.455 -0.494 -0.652 
   (-2.15)** (-1.69)* (-1.88)* 
MA*CEODUAL    2.576 
     (1.65)* 
INDEP -0.021 -0.038 0.035 -0.047 
  (-0.05) (-0.12) (0.08) (-0.12) 
BSIZE -0.378 -0.250 -0.495 -0.408 
  (-0.48) (-0.44) (-0.62) (-0.52) 
BMEETS -0.326 -0.325 -0.372 -0.331 
  (-1.07) (-1.56) (-1.21) (-1.06) 
DGENDER 0.250 -0.027 0.232 0.242 
  (0.86) (-0.13) (0.79) (0.82) 
INSOWN -0.093 0.216 -0.075 -0.042 
  (-0.26) (1.24) (-0.21) (-0.12) 
Fixed effects YI YI YI YI 
Baseline controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.208 0.189 0.204 0.206 
Obs 622 622 622 622 
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Table 10: Managerial ability, institutional investors, and SEO issuance choice 
This table presents the empirical analysis results of the relation between managerial ability in association with 
institutional investors and SEO issuance decisions. The dependent variable is SEOchoicei,t, a dummy variable 
taking the value of one if the firm offers accelerated SEOs, and zero for firm commitment SEOs. We employ the 
managerial ability score developed by Demerjian et al. (2012) to proxy for managerial ability. We also use a 
number of proxies for institutional investors’ ownership characteristics, including institutional ownership to 
share outstanding at the last quarter immediately prior to the announcement (INSOWN); the number of shares 
held by dedicated institutional investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding in the firm 
(INSDED); the number of shares held by quasi institutional investors and dedicated investors divided by the 
total number of shares outstanding in the firm (INSACTIVE); and the number of shares held by Transient 
institutional investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding in the firm (INDTRA). We report the 
results in Panels A through D. We further combine together these institutional investors’ ownership 
characteristics in a full model and present the results in Panel E. Control variables include firm size (SIZE), 
liquidity (LIQUID), risk (IDYRISK), relative issue size (OPTOTA), shelf offering (DSHELF, DSHELF_1), age 
(AGE), book-to-market ratio (BM), and leverage (LEVERAGE). The construction of the related variables is 
detailed in the Appendix. Year and industry dummies are also included to control for year-industry fixed effects. 
The z-statistics shown in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Role of institutional ownership (INSOWN) on SEO issuance choice decisions 
 Accelerated SEOs vs. Firm Commitment SEOs 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MA  0.527 0.654 0.652 0.772 0.425 
   (2.14)** (2.66)** (2.66)** (3.21)*** (2.06)** 
INSOWN  0.150 0.104 0.076 0.156 0.181 0.079 
  (0.64) (0.84) (0.60) (1.26) (1.48) (0.62) 
SIZE 0.239 0.167 
   
0.126 
  (2.50)** (4.71)*** 
   
(2.54)** 
LIQUID -0.125 
 
-0.217 
  
-0.075 
  (-0.87) 
 
(-4.02)*** 
  
(-1.02) 
IDYRISK -6.173 
  
-7.848 
 
-1.918 
  (-0.99) 
  
(-2.47)** 
 
(-0.65) 
OPTOTA 0.017 
   
-0.106 0.002 
  (0.09) 
   
(-1.05) (0.05) 
Fixed effects YI YI YI YI YI YI 
Baseline controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.161 0.165 0.159 0.151 0.146 0.167 
Obs 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 
 
Panel B: Role of dedicated institutional ownership (INSDED) on SEO issuance choice decisions 
 Accelerated SEOs vs. Firm Commitment SEOs 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MA  1.135 1.338 1.321 1.553 1.100 
   (2.57)** (3.04)*** (3.01)*** (3.61)*** (2.47)** 
INSDED -1.052 -0.998 -0.962 -0.618 -0.436 -1.115 
  (-1.33) (-1.30) (-1.26) (-0.86) (-0.62) (-1.43) 
SIZE 0.243 0.305 
   
0.213 
  (2.54)** (4.55)*** 
   
(2.23)** 
LIQUID -0.154 
 
-0.415 
  
-0.168 
  (-1.10) 
 
(-4.22)*** 
  
(-1.20) 
IDYRISK -6.564 
  
-16.752 
 
-4.040 
  (-1.03) 
  
(-2.51)** 
 
(-0.67) 
OPTOTA 0.004 
   
-0.230 -0.007 
  (0.03) 
   
(-0.93) (-0.06) 
Fixed effects YI YI YI YI YI YI 
Baseline controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.162 0.166 0.161 0.153 0.147 0.168 
Obs 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 
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Panel C: Role of quasi institutional ownership (INSACTIVE) on SEO issuance choice decisions 
 Accelerated SEOs vs. Firm Commitment SEOs 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MA  0.481 0.655 0.656 0.784 0.473 
   (1.93)* (2.67)*** (2.69)*** (3.28)*** (1.90)* 
INSACTIVE 0.044 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.15) (1.46) (1.06) (0.91) (0.78) (1.45) 
SIZE 0.140 0.189 
   
0.147 
  (2.86)*** (5.15)*** 
   
(2.82)*** 
LIQUID -0.073 
 
-0.222 
  
-0.070 
  (-0.94) 
 
(-4.28)*** 
  
(-0.96) 
IDYRISK -2.918 
  
-8.148 
 
-1.830 
  (-0.93) 
  
(-2.59)*** 
 
(-0.61) 
OPTOTA 0.008 
   
-0.112 0.007 
  (0.15) 
   
(-1.09) (0.12) 
Fixed effects YI YI YI YI YI YI 
Baseline controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.163 0.165 0.161 0.150 0.144 0.168 
Obs 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 
 
Panel D: Role of transient institutional ownership (INSTRA) on SEO issuance choice decisions 
 Accelerated SEOs vs. Firm Commitment SEOs 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MA  1.123 1.315 1.313 1.545 1.099 
   (2.54)** (2.99)*** (2.99)*** (3.59)*** (2.47)** 
INSTRA -0.969 -0.751 -1.263 -0.489 -0.346 -1.059 
  (-1.30) (-1.04) (-1.68)* (-0.69) (-0.51) (-1.40) 
SIZE 0.287 0.299 
   
0.194 
  (2.88)*** (4.54)*** 
   
(2.04)** 
LIQUID -0.170 
 
-0.441 
  
-0.208 
  (-1.16) 
 
(-4.38)*** 
  
(-1.43) 
IDYRISK -5.482 
  
-16.482 
 
-3.320 
  (-0.86) 
  
(-2.48)** 
 
(-0.56) 
OPTOTA 0.017 
   
-0.221 -0.002 
  (0.15) 
   
(-0.94) (-0.02) 
Fixed effects YI YI YI YI YI YI 
Baseline controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.162 0.165 0.163 0.152 0.147 0.168 
Obs 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 
 
Panel E: institutional ownership characteristics and SEO issuance choice decisions 
 
Accelerated SEOs vs. Firm Commitment SEOs 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MA  1.051 1.339 1.338 1.572 1.048 
   (2.35)** (3.04)*** (3.05)*** (3.65)*** (2.34)** 
INSDED -0.974 -0.944 -0.858 -0.578 -0.412 -1.029 
  (-1.27) (-1.25) (-1.17) (-0.81) (-0.58) (-1.36) 
INSTRA -0.969 -0.749 -1.204 -0.428 -0.293 -1.008 
  (-1.30) (-1.05) (-1.62) (-0.61) (-0.43) (-1.34) 
INSACTIVE 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (-1.70)* (-1.65)* (-0.02) (0.45) (0.62) (-1.26) 
SIZE 0.287 0.348 
   
0.243 
  (2.88)*** (4.93)*** 
   
(2.42)** 
LIQUID -0.170 
 
-0.457 
  
-0.194 
  (-1.16) 
 
(-4.43)*** 
  
(-1.32) 
IDYRISK -5.482 
  
-16.816 
 
-3.210 
  (-0.86) 
  
(-2.49)** 
 
(-0.53) 
OPTOTA 0.017 
   
-0.224 0.002 
  (0.15) 
   
(-0.93) (0.02) 
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Fixed effects YI YI YI YI YI YI 
Baseline controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.165 0.168 0.164 0.153 0.148 0.170 
Obs 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 1,568 
 
